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IS RESISTANCE TO FOREIGN LAW ROOTED IN 
RACISM? 
Sheldon Bernard Lyke* 
INTRODUCTION 
Racism and oppression inhibit society and its actors and institutions 
from understanding the intricacies of ethnicity and race. This inhibition 
makes it more difficult for society to find solutions and remedy oppression. 
This Essay examines racism in the specific context of “transjudicial 
communications.” Anne-Marie Slaughter coined this term to describe the 
practice of courts in one country citing to the opinions and decisions of 
courts in foreign countries.1 In the United States, domestic issues of race 
may shape how legal actors and institutions understand and utilize 
transjudicial communications. In numerous instances, lawmakers and 
judges have expressed resistance to foreign law while debating aspects of 
racial inequality and racism in the United States. 
More specifically, racism may fuel myopia on the Supreme Court of 
the United States by blocking Justices from access to useful foreign legal 
decisions. As a result, the Justices’ learning process regarding ethnicity and 
race is stifled. This is a troubling issue, particularly where the perspective 
lent by transjudicial communications could have been helpful in the Court’s 
recent discussions of the constitutionality of both race-conscious 
admissions in higher education and bans on race-conscious affirmative 
action programs. Specifically, a recent Brazilian Supreme Federal Court 
decision could have shed light on how the U.S. Supreme Court should view 
the relation between diversity and equality, how universities might address 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s concern over applications that allow for self-
identification without third-party review, and whether to characterize 
affirmative action programs as benignly discriminatory, as opposed to 
manifestations of substantive equality. 
The goal of this Essay is to situate transjudicial communications and 
the backlash against foreign legal citations into a conversation about race 
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and racism. The goal is not to try to prove that opposition to foreign law is 
racist. That claim is better left for future research. Rather, at a minimum, 
the resistance to foreign and international law has correlations to racism and 
is grounded in a racial narrative. 
In discussing racism and transjudicial communications, this Essay 
begins with a working definition of the contested conceptualization of 
globalization because transjudicial communications are a specific example 
of globalization. Second, I provide a brief overview of transjudicial 
communications in the United States and discuss how resistance to this 
process is linked to oppression and racism. Finally, I argue how racially-
rooted resistance to foreign legal citation inhibits the possibilities for U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices to learn about race in the context of race-conscious 
university admissions. I use the example of the Supreme Federal Court of 
Brazil’s landmark affirmative action decision issued in April 2012 as an 
example of a missed opportunity for the U.S. Supreme Court to learn about 
race and the crafting of appropriate race-conscious remedies.2 
I. WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION? 
The citation of foreign authorities on domestic constitutional matters is 
a particularized manifestation of the globalization of law. Therefore, it is 
helpful to have a working definition of the term “globalization” before 
proceeding. Talk of the globalization of law may make some think of a law 
with a worldwide reach that spreads throughout the world and leads to 
greater homogeneity. This, however, is not an entirely accurate 
representation of globalization. 
Often overused to describe and explain almost every phenomenon, 
globalization—especially as used in popular discourse—is messy. 
“Globalization” is a term that can mean everything to everybody. For some 
people, it means the liberalization of policies.3 For others, it means 
universalization, and for others, it means westernization.4 The term 
appeared as early as the 1960s, and it “has been variously used in both 
popular and academic literature to describe a process, a condition, a system, 
a force, and an age.”5 Given all these meanings, the word can often be 
obscure and invite confusion. Although there are a number of different 
 
2
  S.T.F., Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental [ADPF] No. 186/DF, Relator: Des. 
Ricardo Lewandowski, 26.04.2012 (Braz.) [hereinafter ADPF 186], available at http://www.stf.jus.br/
arquivo/cms/noticianoticiastf/anexo/adpf186rl.pdf [http://perma.cc/PVR3-BYHN]. 
3
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[http://perma.cc/Q7UG-G4EZ]; see also Alexander Heffner, Turnaround—Lessons from the Third 
World, USA TODAY (Mar. 24, 2013, 9:02 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/ 
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5
  MANFRED B. STEGNER, GLOBALIZATION: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 8 (2d ed. 2009). 
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scholarly definitions of globalization,6 there is some overlap and agreement 
regarding the essence of its meaning. For many scholars, globalization is a 
set of social processes that: (1) creates and multiplies existing social 
networks that overcome political, economic, cultural, and geographic 
boundaries, (2) expands and stretches social networks and 
interdependencies, (3) intensifies and accelerates social exchanges and 
activities, and (4) fosters in people a growing subjective awareness of 
deepening connections between the local and the distant and the global.7 
Scholars have identified transjudicial communications as an example 
of globalization.8 This does not mean, however, that the use of transjudicial 
communications will lead to foreign law replacing U.S. law. Rather, 
transjudicial communications could serve to inform and educate judges in 
the U.S., helping them to approach cases, particularly ones involving 
ethnicity and race, with a perspective that remains rooted in U.S. law. 
In discussing transjudicial communications, L’Heureux-Dubé argues 
that one of the major factors leading to change and transjudicial 
communications is advances in technology.9 But this explanation is only 
part of the story. Globalization is not simply limited to electronic 
technology. Globalization is a social process.10 One can imagine a world 
where everyone has Internet connectivity—but if some perceive the Internet 
as dangerous, or amoral, those individuals will not use the Internet. 
The same is true with respect to transjudicial communications. The 
availability of foreign decisions on the Internet does not mean that U.S. 
Justices will use them. National, cultural, political, and social forces can 
cause these Justices to perceive foreign law as problematic, despite its 
possible benefits. The next Part explores the possibly racist and oppressive 
U.S. conservative understandings and rejections of foreign law and 
transjudicial communications. 
II. TRANSJUDICIAL COMMUNICATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the U.S. Supreme Court, foreign legal citation has been sporadic 
and, until 2002, relatively uncontroversial. For example, the Court cited 
 
6
  No definition of globalization is completely unambiguous. See SCHOLTE, supra note 3, at 52–54. 
7
  STEGNER, supra note 5, at 14–15. 
8
  See e.g., Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the 
International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15 (1998) [http://perma.cc/QPE5-LEHR]; 
Slaughter, supra note 1, at 103. 
9
  L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 8, at 25. 
10
  L’Heureux-Dubé identifies some sociological factors, e.g., that judges are considering similar 
issues and have personal contact with one another. L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 8, at 23, 26. But one 
may also consider a number of other cultural and sociological factors when trying to ascertain how a 
country’s judiciary makes meaning of the Internet and the propriety of using transjudicial 
communications. While L’Heureux-Dubé identifies some of the sociological pull factors that encourage 
individuals and institutions to participate in globalization, this Essay focuses more on the factors (e.g., 
racism as a factor) that push against global social processes. 
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foreign legal authority (i.e., foreign statutes and practices) in the landmark 
decision of Miranda v. Arizona.11 In the 1990s, without controversy, 
conservative Chief Justice William Rehnquist endorsed the citation of 
foreign law—specifically citing the decisions of foreign judges in two 
controversial landmark decisions: the reproductive rights case Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey,12 and the assisted suicide decision Washington v. 
Glucksberg.13 
The first glimpse of controversy over transjudicial communications 
took place in 2002, when the Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, ruling that 
the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment.14 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens referenced a 
European Union amicus brief and described how the world community 
disapproved of the death penalty for the mentally retarded.15 In dissent, 
Justice Scalia sharply criticized the reference and even bestowed an award 
for the footnote: “[T]he Prize for Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 
‘national consensus’ must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a 
footnote) to the views of assorted professional and religious organizations, 
members of the so-called ‘world community,’ and respondents to opinion 
polls.”16 
In the next year, the kerfuffle over the use of foreign authority erupted 
beyond the Court in Lawrence v. Texas, when the court invalidated state 
criminal laws that prohibited same-sex sodomy.17 In this decision, Justice 
Kennedy cited a European Court on Human Rights opinion.18 The debate 
over the use of foreign law continued in the Court largely in the form of 
critiques lodged by Justice Scalia in dissent to the Lawrence majority.19 
With foreign citations occurring in high-profile cases as early as the 1960s, 
the press nonetheless characterized the foreign citation in Lawrence as new. 
One journalist mistakenly wrote, “Never before had the Supreme Court’s 
majority cited a foreign legal precedent in such a big case.”20 
 
11
  384 U.S. 436, 486–90 (1966) (referencing foreign sources of law from several countries, 
including England, Scotland, and India) [http://perma.cc/B5B8-5US4]. 
12
  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring) [http://perma.cc/3PTR-MAS6]. 
13
  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718 n.16 (1997) [http://perma.cc/9GS6-8KMB]. In 
Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited the courts of last resort in Canada and Colombia because 
these were countries “embroiled” in a similar debate on euthanasia. Id. 
14
  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) [http://perma.cc/RD4A-C8HF]. 
15
  Id. at 316 n.21. 
16
  Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
17
  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) [http://perma.cc/9P22-4HMV]. 
18
  Id. at 573. 
19
  See, e.g., id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
20
  Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Citing More Foreign Cases, USA TODAY (July 7, 2003, 9:19 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-07-07-foreign-usat_x.htm [http://perma.cc/UV8E-
FSH3]. As discussed previously, the Court cited foreign authority in other landmark cases including 
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In the ten years since Lawrence, there has been significant legislative 
resistance via the introduction of resolutions and bills to prohibit the 
citation of foreign law.21 Additionally, legislators have made their resistance 
public. For example, Florida Congresswoman Sandy Adams wrote in an op-
ed: 
The imposition of foreign precedent into our federal court system is a real 
threat to our Constitution and could fundamentally break down the very 
system put in place by our forefathers more than 200 years ago. Each case that 
cites foreign law is another opportunity to set precedent and for the 
Constitution to be challenged and overrun.22 
This resistance to foreign legal citation has roots in oppression, 
generally, and in race and ethnicity, specifically. One can observe these 
links to racism both tangentially and more directly. First, tangential and 
circumstantial correlations exist between resistance to foreign law and race. 
A close examination of Atkins and Lawrence, each of which provoked 
strong resistance to foreign law, reveals the racial issues that coincide with 
that resistance. 
At the heart of Atkins is the death penalty, an issue that is steeped in 
race in the United States. A number of studies demonstrate the significant 
effect that race has on whether an individual will receive the death 
penalty.23 For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee on 
Racial and Gender Bias in the Justice System noted that black defendants 
received the death penalty at a “significantly higher rate” than non-black 
defendants who were similarly situated.24 Additionally, the Committee 
concluded that one-third of Philadelphia County’s black death row inmates 
would have received a sentence of life imprisonment had they not been 
 
Miranda, Casey, and Glucksberg, see cases cited supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
21
  On March 20, 2005, Senator John Cornyn introduced a Senate Resolution against the use of 
foreign legal decisions. S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005) [http://perma.cc/YT8H-FYQB]. See also H.R. 
Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004) [http://perma.cc/K2VL-85PH]. More recently, then-Representative Sandy 
Adams introduced a bill to bar the use of foreign legal authority at the federal level. H.R. 973, 112th 
Cong. (2011) [http://perma.cc/U9U4-A6FW]. 
22




  See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY 
SYSTEMS: THE PENNSYLVANIA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT (2007), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content//aba/migrated//assessmentproject//finalreport.authcheckdam.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/PFU8-PJVS]; JOHN J. DONOHUE III, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CONNECTICUT, 1973–




  See PA. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON RACIAL AND GENDER BIAS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, FINAL 
REPORT 201 (2003), available at http://www.pa-interbranchcommission.com/_pdfs/FinalReport.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/G3SG-XXYN]. 
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black.25 
The resistance to foreign law in Lawrence is situated next to opposition 
to same-sex rights. There may be links between the resistance to foreign 
law and the resistance to recognizing the rights and liberties of individuals 
with same-sex desire. A racial correlation exists as well. Most people are 
unaware that there were two petitioners in Lawrence: the named petitioner, 
John Geddes Lawrence, and his black partner, Tyron Garner.26 Garner’s 
jealous boyfriend, Robert Eubanks—who was known to refer to Garner as a 
“nigger”—called the Harris County Sheriff’s Office to report “a black male 
going crazy with a gun” in Lawrence’s apartment,27 thereby giving the 
police probable cause to enter. While most consider Lawrence a same-sex 
rights decision, the actual case has unique, often ignored racial factors and 
origins, which arguably led to the sodomy charge. 
These features of Atkins and Lawrence do not definitively prove that 
the racial inequality present in the background of these decisions is directly 
responsible for resistance to foreign law. Instead, I propose that the 
resistance to foreign law may be a common response to cases arising from 
racist origins and is linked to controversies that are bound up with and 
grounded in racial understandings. 
Second, there are more direct connections between race and ethnicity 
and the resistance to foreign law. For example, a number of states have 
legislated (or are considering) bans on the use of foreign and international 
law in their respective state courts.28 Anti-Islamic and anti-Arab sentiment 
following the events of September 11, 2001 may be partially responsible for 
these actions. Many of the state anti-foreign law initiatives explicitly 
reference and ban the use of sharia law. 
The confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominees have provided 
another instance to observe a direct connection between race and resistance 
to foreign law. During the Congressional hearings questioning then-
nominee Sonia Sotomayor, disadvantaged minority identities—in the areas 
of race, ethnicity, and gender—were social attributes folded into questions 
framing foreign law as a dangerous stranger worthy of resistance. In the 
sole case of Justice Sotomayor,29 conservatives established a connection 
 
25
  Id. 
26
  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
27
  DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 61–74 (2012). See 
Chapter 5 for a detailed account of the arrest of Tyron Garner and John Lawrence. 
28
  See, e.g., MARTHA F. DAVIS & JOHANNA KALB, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, 
OKLAHOMA STATE QUESTION 755 AND AN ANALYSIS OF ANTI-INTERNATIONAL LAW INITIATIVES 
(2011) [http://perma.cc/N4UG-68TX]; Donna Leinwand, More States Enter Debate on Sharia Law, 
USA TODAY (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-12-09-shariaban09_ST_N.htm 
[http://perma.cc/QMK2-S49X]. 
29
  The ethnic backgrounds of Supreme Court nominees arose during the confirmation hearings of 
Justice Alito and Justice Kagan. During Justice Alito’s hearing, questions that focused on his Italian 
identity attempted to highlight his compassion and make him a more sympathetic candidate. See 
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between the social identity of the nominee and her advocacy for the citation 
of foreign law. Specifically, there were attempts to link the subjectivity of 
her diverse ethnic and gender background to a bias in the use of foreign 
law. It was not uncommon for the Senators to discuss Justice Sotomayor’s 
race and gender in the same breath as foreign law. For example, Senator 
Kyl said in his opening statement: 
Many of Judge Sotomayor’s public statements suggest that she may, indeed, 
allow, and even embrace, decision-making based on her biases and prejudices. 
The “wise Latina woman” quote,30 which I referred to earlier, suggests that 
Judge Sotomayor endorses the view that a judge should allow her gender-, 
ethnic-, and experience-based biases to guide her when rendering judicial 
opinions. This is in stark contrast to Judge Paez’s view that these factors 
should be “set aside.” 
In the same lecture, Judge Sotomayor posits that ‘‘there is no objective stance 
but only a series of perspectives—no neutrality, no escape from choice in 
judging’’ and claims that ‘‘[t]he aspiration to impartiality is just that—it’s an 
aspiration because it denies the fact that we are by our experiences making 
different choices than others.’’ No neutrality, no impartiality in judging? Yet 
isn’t that what the judicial oath explicitly requires? 
. . . .  
Judge Sotomayor clearly rejected the notion that judges should strive for an 
impartial brand of justice. She has already “accepted” that her gender and 
Latina heritage will affect the outcome of her cases. 
 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 333 
(2006) [http://perma.cc/78XR-YKKG]. Kagan deliberately used her Jewish identity to bring levity to the 
hearings. When asked by Senator Graham about her whereabouts on Christmas Day 2009—the day 
when Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to set off a plastic explosive in his underwear on board 
Northwest Airlines Flight 253—Justice Kagan said, “You know, like all Jews, I was probably at a 
Chinese restaurant.” See The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 144 (2010) 
[http://perma.cc/LGR7-PPBF]. Yet only during Justice Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings did 
Republicans use social identity (i.e., Latina identity) negatively, and in conjunction with discussions of 
foreign law and bias in judicial interpretation. See Sheldon Bernard Lyke, Making Strange Laws, 35 U. 
PA. J. INT’L L. 675 (2014) (arguing that Supreme Court confirmation hearings reveal a socially 
constructed process where foreign law is transformed into a dangerous stranger). 
30
  In 2001, while delivering the Judge Mario G. Olmos Memorial Lecture at the University of 
California, Berkeley School of Law, Justice Sotomayor stated, “I would hope that a wise Latina woman 
with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white 
male who hasn’t lived that life.” Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 
87, 92 (2002) [http://perma.cc/BV8R-DWNX]. The “wise Latina” comment—which was a staple of 
speeches she delivered as early as 1994—drew heavy criticism from some Republicans during Justice 
Sotomayor’s confirmation hearing in 2009. See Sotomayor’s ‘Wise Latina’ Comment a Staple of Her 
Speeches, (June 8, 2009, 1:39 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/06/05/sotomayor.speeches/ 
[http://perma.cc/P8D4-3Q32]. 
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This is a serious issue, and it’s not the only indication that Judge Sotomayor 
has an expansive view of what a judge may appropriately consider. In a speech 
to the Puerto Rican ACLU, Judge Sotomayor endorsed the idea that American 
judges should use “good ideas” found in foreign law so that America does not 
lose “influence in the world.” 
. . . [T]he laws and practices of foreign nations are simply irrelevant to 
interpreting the will of the American people as expressed through our 
Constitution. 
Additionally, the vast expanse of foreign judicial opinions and practices from 
which one might draw simply gives activist judges cover for promoting their 
personal preferences instead of the law.31 
Senator Kyl specifically categorized Justice Sotomayor’s gendered and 
ethnic background as a source of bias. He linked his perception of an 
ethnic-racial bias to her endorsement of using foreign judicial opinions. 
In summary, the goal of this part of the Essay is not to definitively 
prove that opposition to foreign law is a manifestation of racism. My claim 
is more modest and instead argues that the resistance to foreign law, at a 
minimum, may correlate to sentiments and structures of racial inequality. 
III. FOREIGN LEGAL CITATION AND RACE-CONSCIOUS  
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
 
The racialized resistance to foreign law has implications for 
understandings of race in the context of U.S. Supreme Court cases on race-
conscious affirmative action programs. Citation to foreign and international 
law in such cases occurred only when Justice Ginsburg cited the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women in her concurring opinion in Grutter v. 
Bollinger32 and her dissent in Gratz v. Bollinger.33 Foreign courts, however, 
have used U.S. Supreme Court decisions in race-conscious university 
admissions cases.34 Most notable is the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court’s 
recent decision in ADPF 186.35 The unanimous decision endorsed race-
 
31
  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
1006 (2009) (statement of Sen. John Kyl) [http://perma.cc/4XUX-PP4B]. 
32
  539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) [http://perma.cc/H8T2-SGEJ]. 
33
  539 U.S. 244, 302 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) [http://perma.cc/G68K-UW47]. 
34
  See, e.g., Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2007) 4 S.C.R. 493 (India) (citing Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)) [http://perma.cc/RJ6Y-YZYN]; Seneviratne v. Univ. Grants 
Comm’n, [1978–80] 1 Sri L.R. 182 (Sri Lanka) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265 (1978)) [http://perma.cc/P98V-JW58]. 
35
  ADPF 186, supra note 2. An ADPF is a Claim of Breach of Fundamental Precept, which is an 
action brought to protect the guidelines and principles of the Brazilian Constitution and to prevent and 
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conscious admissions policies. The ruling declared that the Federal 
University of Brasilia’s affirmative action quota program was a 
constitutional means to (1) create a diverse academic environment, (2) 
combat a history of racial discrimination, and (3) promote de facto racial 
equality in education.36 
The ADPF 186 decision cited extensively to Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz 
and dedicated an entire section of the opinion to “Affirmative Action in the 
United States of America.”37 The Court in Grutter held that race could be 
used to meet the compelling government interest in achieving educational 
diversity.38 The Grutter decision, however, reaffirms the Bakke decision, 
which abandoned the use of racial and ethnic quotas in university 
admissions.39 For the Grutter Court, race is an acceptable means for 
enriching the educational process, but following the race-blind strict 
scrutiny approach, the Court ultimately sees race-conscious admissions as 
an obstruction to equality, as opposed to a means towards it.40 
The Federal Supreme Court decision provides a great illustration of the 
globalization or stretching of law that does not merely lead to homogeneity. 
The Brazilian court citation to the United States was an exercise in 
comparative legal decision-making, and did not result in mere mimicry. 
Despite reviewing these U.S. cases, the ADPF 186 ruling distinguished 
itself from the U.S. Supreme Court and its refusal to validate quotas.41 The 
Brazilian court noted that structural differences exist between the two 
countries’ constitutions that allow Brazil to offer a more liberal remedy.42 
Additionally, while the ADPF 186 decision mentioned Grutter and 
diversity, it did not discuss diversity in a manner wholly consistent with 
Grutter. For example, the Brazilian court touched on a rationale articulated 
in Grutter that diversity is important because it brings value to and enriches 
the educational experience. The ADPF 186 opinion stated: “It is true to say, 
moreover, the great beneficiary of affirmative action policies is not the one 
 
repair any violations to these fundamental precepts by the public power. Legal Glossary, SUPREMO 
TRIBUNAL FEDERAL, http://www2.stf.jus.br/portalStfInternacional/cms/verGlossario.php?sigla= 
portalStfGlossario_en_us&indice=C&verbete=174624 (last visited July 29, 2014) [http://perma.cc/ 
HQ6M-H35A]. For information regarding the Court, see About the Court, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL 
FEDERAL, http://www2.stf.jus.br//cms/verConteudo.php?sigla=portalStfSobreCorte_en_us (last visited 
July 29, 2014) [http://perma.cc/SW6Q-JW36]. 
36
  ADPF 186, supra note 2. 
37
  See id. at 33–44 (section entitled “AS AÇÕES AFIRMATIVAS NOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DA 
AMÉRICA”). 
38
  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
39
  Id. at 334 (stating that it is unconstitutional to establish quotas for racial and ethnic groups). 
40
  Id. at 333. 
41
  ADPF 186, supra note 2, at 41. 
42
  Id. (“The Brazilian Constitution—it is important to note—allows an approach to affirmative 
action policies that is more comprehensive than that made by the Supreme Court of the United States.”) 
(author’s translation). 
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student who entered the university through policies to reserve places, but 
the entire academy who will have the opportunity to mingle with the 
other.”43 
The Brazilian court, however, moved beyond a mere diversity rationale 
and linked this discussion of the value of diversity as a means to achieve 
equality: 
 It is therefore necessary to build a public space open to the inclusion of the 
other, the social outsider. An area covering otherness. And the University is 
the ideal space for the demystification of social prejudices with respect to each 
other and therefore for the construction of a plural and culturally 
heterogeneous collective consciousness that is consistent with the globalized 
world in which we live. 
 It was exactly the perception that diversity is a component essence of 
university education that guided the decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States of America where they examined the constitutionality of 
affirmative action policies, for example, Bakke v. Regents of the University of 
California (1978), Gratz v. Bollinger (2003), and Grutter v. Bollinger (2003).44 
Thus, although overlap exists between the Brazilian and U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions, specifically with respect to the value of diversity in 
education and the demystification of social prejudices, several significant 
differences emerge. For example, the Court in Grutter did not imagine the 
role of the university as a racial integrator,45 nor did its earlier decision in 
Bakke support the view that a compelling use of race (or a goal of diversity) 
was the inclusion of social outsiders.46 These arguments veer away from 
U.S. judicial conceptualizations of diversity. The Brazilian court, however, 
appears to hold that the use of racial quotas promotes diversity while also 
promoting equality.47 
Even though U.S. precedent informed the ADPF 186 ruling, this 
landmark Brazilian case did not have a similar effect on the Supreme 
Court’s latest considerations of race-conscious admissions policies in 
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,48 and anti-affirmative action ballot 
initiatives in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action.49 There was 
 
43
  Id. at 31 (author’s translation). 
44
  Id. at 32 (author’s translation). 
45
  Compare id. at 30–33 (arguing in a section entitled “O PAPEL INTEGRADOR DA 
UNIVERSIDADE,” or the “Role of the University as Integrator,” that universities are ideal sites for 
racial inclusion) with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328–33 (2003) (discussing the positive effects 
of racial diversity on the quality of education and “diffusion of knowledge and opportunity”). 
46
  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978) (rejecting the argument that 
general societal discrimination was a compelling government interest, and thereby denying states the 
right to use racial classifications) [http://perma.cc/M3AU-ZHF2]. 
47
  ADPF 186, supra note 2, at 32. 
48
  133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) [http://perma.cc/XT3P-YGMW]. 
49
  Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for 
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no mention of the Brazilian decision in oral arguments,50 and none of the 
Justices referred to the case in their written opinions. Given the resistance to 
foreign law—and the racial correlations to this opposition—it is not 
surprising that the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Fisher 
and Schuette were devoid of discussion of foreign and international law. 
Relying on the Brazilian court’s assessment that the constitution of 
Brazil might be less constrained than that of the U.S.,51 some might argue 
that there is no reason for the U.S. Supreme Court to pay attention to the 
ADPF 186. If the U.S. Constitution is more constrained, then there is no 
need to reference ADPF 186. First, the constitutional differences between 
the two countries might not be severe enough to bar the remedy granted in 
the ADPF 186 decision.52 Secondly, comparative and international law 
would not be in existence if courts only referenced constitutional systems 
that were largely, or mostly, identical to their own. Lastly, engaging in 
comparative analysis creates robust opinions. Judges citing foreign law in a 
comparative area not only engage a variety of different perspectives, but 
these perspectives belong to their peers who are facing similar issues and 
deciding issues of equality and fairness. Such considerations increase the 
chances that a particular judge will have the opportunity to write a more 
thorough decision. 
The ADPF 186 decision could have served as a useful source of 
information for the Fisher Court, however. First, as mentioned above, the 
Brazilian case provides an alternate example of the ways in which the use 
of race to achieve diversity is not necessarily antithetical to achieving 
equality. Though the decision discusses diversity, it prominently grounds its 
reasoning in promoting equality by ending racism and social exclusion.53 
 
Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) [http://perma.cc/97H3-VCYM]. 
50
  Transcript of Oral Argument, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-
345) [http://perma.cc/5JKD-QVRH]; Transcript of Oral Argument, Schuette v. Coal. to Defend 
Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary 
(BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) (No. 12-682) [http://perma.cc/BBT6-FGJY]. 
51
  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
52
  While the Brazilian court notes differences between the Brazilian and American constitutions, the 
court does not characterize or identify the specific structural differences that permit Brazil to adopt a 
more comprehensive approach to affirmative action. Therefore, while I acknowledge that there are 
constitutional differences, I am cautious to overemphasize the Brazilian court’s structural claims 
explanation. There is nothing evident from the actual structure of the United States Constitution that 
would preclude the Court from adopting the same approach to affirmative action that Brazil adopted. 
One could argue easily, however, that the Brazilian approach to affirmative action is less a product of 
constitutional structure, and more a result of judicial interpretation. As a result, the Court would be less 
likely to approve Brazil’s comprehensive affirmative action policies, because of U.S. equal protection 
doctrine jurisprudence. 
53
  See, e.g., ADPF 186, supra note 2, at 4–6 (discussing formal versus material equality and that it is 
the duty of the government to provide material equality, not simply proclaim the principle of equality in 
formal terms); Tanya K. Hernandez, The View of Affirmative Action from the Other Side of the 
Americas, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 9, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tanya-k-
hernandez/fischer-v-texas_b_1951278.html [http://perma.cc/ST6-5ZMN]. 
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Diversity and the provision of de facto racial equality can be framed as 
mutually constitutive. This is not a novel idea. Rather, it somewhat reflects 
the original aim and interpretation of Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke.54 
Second, the Brazilian comparison can inform an issue that arose during 
oral argument in Fisher on the problem of racial identification. During oral 
argument, Chief Justice Roberts questioned Gregory Garre, attorney for The 
University of Texas, about the racial identification of student applicants: 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, before—I need to figure out exactly 
what these numbers mean. Should someone who is one-quarter Hispanic check 
the Hispanic box or some different box? 
MR. GARRE: Your Honor, there is a multiracial box. Students check boxes 
based on their own determination. Now, this is true under the Common 
Application— 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I suppose a person who is one-quarter 
percent Hispanic, his own determination, would be, I’m one-quarter percent 
Hispanic. 
MR. GARRE: Then they would check that box, Your Honor, as is true of 
any— 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: They would check that box. What about one-
eighth? 
MR. GARRE: Your Honor, that was—they—they would make that self-
determination, Your Honor. If—if anyone, in any part of the application, 
violated some honor code then that could come out— 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Would it violate the honor code for someone 
who is one-eighth Hispanic and says, I identify as Hispanic, to check the 
Hispanic box? 
MR. GARRE: I don’t think—I don’t think it would, Your Honor. I don’t think 
that that issue would be any different than the plan upheld in Grutter or the 
Harvard plan or in Bakke— 




  Brief for Respondents Kimberly James, et al. at 17, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) 
(No. 02-241) (describing the link between equality and diversity: “To most Americans, uniting the 
nation on the basis of Justice Powell’s conception of diversity merged easily with the aspirations 
inspired by Brown to unite the nation on the basis of integration.”) [http://perma.cc/7VBG-YYCF]. 
There are both conservative and progressive critiques to this approach. A conservative view, which more 
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halt it.” Id. 
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MR. GARRE: We do not, Your Honor, and no college in America, the Ivy 
Leagues, the Little Ivy Leagues, that I’m aware of. 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So how do you know you have 15 percent 
African American—Hispanic or 15 percent minority?55 
At the heart of Chief Justice Roberts’s questioning is a focus on how 
the government can identify an applicant’s race for the purpose of 
administrating a race-conscious admissions program. Attorney Garre’s 
main answer to the Chief Justice’s inquiry was that applicants have the 
opportunity to self-identify their ethnic and racial group(s) during the 
admissions process. This was a question of immense importance in the 
Brazil case because of an interest to facilitate the redistribution and avoid 
instances of individuals attempting to fraudulently gain benefits.56 The 
Brazilian court identified two different methods of racial identification: 
self-identification (autoidentificação) and identification by others 
(heteroidentificação).57 The decision ruled that it was constitutional for a 
university to administer the two methods or a combination of both selection 
systems, provided that they never cease to respect the personal dignity of 
the candidates and that they comply with certain criteria.58 Some of these 
criteria included that (a) classification by the racial identification committee 
must be made after the candidate’s self-identification as black or brown (to 
curb the dominance of a third-party classification) and (b) classification 
should be conducted by phenotype and not by descent.59 The Brazilian 
approach may help shed light on the methods that the United States wants 
to adopt or avoid. 
Finally, if the Schuette ruling engaged a comparative analysis of the 
ADPF 186 decision, then perhaps the Court could have analyzed 
affirmative action bans using a framework focused on formal/substantive 
equality, instead of one centered on benign-invidious discrimination. The 
benign-invidious distinction was pervasive in Schuette,60 and flows from the 
 
55
  Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–33, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) 
(No. 11-345). 
56
  The Brazil court quotes Daniela Ikawa in saying that the use of hetero-identification or, 
identification by others, can be used because of a desire “to suppress possible fraud identification as it 
refers to obtaining benefits, and to delineate the right to redistribution as closely as possible.” ADPF 
186, supra note 2, at 38 (quoting DANIELA IKAWA, AÇÕES AFIRMATIVAS EM UNIVERSIDADES 129–30 
(Lúmen Júris 2008)). 
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  See ADPF 186, supra note 2, at 38. 
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  Id. at 39. 
59
  Id. at 38–39. 
60
  Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion described that “What is at stake here is not whether injury 
will be inflicted but whether government can be instructed not to follow a course that entails . . . the 
grant of favored status to persons in some racial categories and not others.” Schuette v. Coal. to Defend 
Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary 
(BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014). In his concurrence, Justice Scalia discussed “the notion of 
‘benign’ racial discrimination.” Id. at 1639 (Scalia, J. concurring). In dissent, Justice Sotomayor stated 
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belief that only invidious discrimination should be suspect and that when 
racial discrimination benefits racial minorities, it should not be subject to 
heightened scrutiny. The Court has ruled, however, that regardless of the 
benign-invidious distinction, racially discriminatory government 
classifications will be held to the same standard of heightened scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause.61 
If one believes that affirmative action is a tool for achieving equality, 
then characterizing affirmative action policies as discriminatory is deeply 
problematic. The Brazilian court dealt with the issue of characterizing 
affirmative action in a slightly different way. The court did not describe 
affirmative action as a policy that punishes the white majority, yet is 
excused because it provides benign results for racial minorities. Instead, the 
Brazilian court discussed affirmative action as a manifestation of equality. 
The court drew on the difference between formal equality—where the law 
is facially neutral—and material (or substantive) equality—where 
individuals actually experience similar treatment; the court stated that is the 
duty of the government to provide material equality.62 
In his Schuette concurrence, Justice Scalia highlights the problem 
when a court takes a narrow view of material equality. Under the Court’s 
current equal protection jurisprudence, when there is a facially neutral state 
action questioned for denying equal protection on racial grounds, the Court 
will ask whether the action reflects a racially discriminatory purpose.63 
Therefore, as long as a state action offers formal equality and has no racial 
motivation, the state action will stand even if it treats racial minorities 
substantively different. In Schuette, a comparative analysis of the ADPF 
186 decision on the question of equal protection could offer an alternative 
framework to the benign-invidious frame overly discussed in the court’s 
jurisprudence. The Brazilian decision could encourage engaging the 
question of whether the Equal Protection Clause should facilitate 
substantive equality and protect minorities that experience disparate impact 
 
that, following the mandate of the Equal Protection Clause, strict scrutiny should not be applied “to 
actions designed to benefit rather than burden the minority.” Id. at 1672 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
61
  See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) [http://perma.cc/6BHH-
CJ46]. R. Richard Banks argued that the benign-invidious framework had continuing importance for the 
Court’s affirmative action decisions from Bakke through the Michigan cases in Gratz and Grutter. R 
Richard Banks, The Benign-Invidious Asymmetry in Equal Protection Analysis, 31 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 573, 574 (2003) [http://perma.cc/E8XP-4E2P]. 
62
  See ADPF 186, supra note 2, at 4–6. The Brazilian court’s approach is not novel. A number of 
scholars have discussed the distinction between formal and material (or substantive) equality. See, e.g., 
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, Sodomy, and Supreme Court 
Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1, 87–88 (2005) [http://perma.cc/9P8Z-XEU6]; Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV. 735, 750–52 (2002) [http://perma.cc/K8TA-
ZPJV]. 
63
  Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1648 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia’s comment is in accord with the rule 
announced in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) [http://perma.cc/VGR5-R9P3], where the Court 
held that a law is not unconstitutional based solely on its racially disproportionate impact. 
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from facially neutral laws. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Essay suggests that the backlash to transjudicial communications 
may have roots in race and racism. Future research should explore these 
suggestions in order to discover whether a causal connection exists between 
racism and the resistance to foreign law. 
Additionally, this Essay examines transjudicial communications that 
speak substantively on racial issues—specifically race-conscious 
affirmative action. Unsurprisingly, while non-U.S. countries cite Bakke, 
Gratz, and Grutter, the Supreme Court of the United States is hesitant to 
cite foreign and international law in its cases. It appears that the U.S. 
judiciary cannot enter cosmopolitan discussions on race with its 
international counterparts. These transjudicial communications could 
nuance the Court’s own conversations on race in the United States, without 
posing a threat to the laws of the United States. The Brazil example offers 
great insight into the affirmative action problem in the United States. The 
Court would do well to view the decision to come up to speed on questions 
of equality and racial identification, even if it does not ultimately mimic the 
exact solutions accepted in the Federal Supreme Court’s ADPF 186 
decision. 
 
